In this paper we present an interacting-agent model of financial markets. We describe a financial market through an Ising model to formulate the tendency of agents getting influenced by the other agents' investment attitude [8] . We formulate the agents' decision making on investment as the minimum energy principle for Tsallis entropy [11] , and demonstrate that the equilibrium probability distribution function of the investment attitude of interacting-agents is the q-exponential distribution. We also show that the power-law distribution of volatility of price fluctuations, which is often demonstrated in the empirical studies [17] , can be explained naturally by our model that have their origin in the collective crowd behavior of many interactingagents.
Introduction
In the past decades, the efficient market hypothesis is the dominating paradigm in finance and financial engineering [1] . The efficient market hypothesis argues that the current price already contains all information and past prices can not help in predicting future prices. In an efficient market, stock prices are completely determined by its fundamentals, given by the present discounted value of the stream of future dividends. The prices would solely be driven by economic news (exogenous random shocks) about changes in fundamentals, so that prices follow a random walk [1] . However, the efficient market hypothesis lost ground rapidly following the accumulation of evidence against the efficient market hypothesis [2] . For instance, Shiller [3] finds that stock market volatility is far greater than could be justified by changes in dividends. A new approach proposed as alternatives to the efficient market theory is the interacting-agent approach that models the trading process with its interaction of a large ensemble of heterogeneous traders. There is the emerging literature on interacting-agent dynamics initiated by W. Brock [4] , A. Kirman [5] , and M. Aoki [6] . A number of interacting-agent models proposed recently showed that they can generate some ubiquitous characteristics (the clustered volatility and the scaling behaviors) found for empirical financial data as a result of interactions between agents. The emergence of realistic scaling laws from the agents' interaction would lend a convinced evidence in favor of the Interacting Agent Hypothesis. Although the interacting agent models are advocated as an alternative approach to the efficient market hypothesis that is equivalent to the rational expectation hypothesis in economics [7] , little attention has been given to the point how probabilistic rules, that an agent switches his opinion, is connected with his expectation formation. Our previous work [8] proposed a new expectation formation hypothesis, that is, the relative expectation formation hypothesis corresponding to the interacting-agent hypothesis. The relative expectations formation of interacting-agents has been formularized by using the minimum average energy principle for Bolztmann-Gibbs entropy [9, 10] . The aim of this paper is to generalize the formulation of the relative expectation formation from the viewpoint of the nonextensive statistical mechanics [11] [12] [13] . The nonextensive statistical mechanics has been introduced as a generalization of the traditional Boltzmann-Gibbs statistical mechanics by C. Tsallis [11] 1 . We shall present an interacting-agent model that follows the line of an Ising-like model of financial markets proposed by our previous work [8] , and formulate the agents' decision-making on investment as the minimum energy principle for Tsallis entropy [11] , and demonstrate that a equilibrium probability distribution on the agent's investment attitude, which is obtained as the so-called q-exponential distribution, is able to be derived from the relative expectations formation. We also show that the interacting-agent model gives an explanation for an universal statistical characteristics of financial data, that is, the power-law tails of the distribution of volatility, measured by the absolute value of relative price changes [17] .
2
An interacting-agent model
The relative expectation formation
We think of the financial market that large numbers of agents (or traders) participate in trading. Traders are indexed by j = 1, 2, ........, N. We assume that each of them can share one of two investment attitudes, buyer or seller, and buy or sell a fixed amount of the asset (q) in a period. x i denotes the investment attitude of trader i at a period. The investment attitude x i is defined as follows: if trader i is the buyer of the asset at a period, then x i = +1. If trader i, in contrast, is the seller of the asset at a period, then x i = −1. A trader, who expects a certain exchange profit through trading, will predict every other traders' behavior in order to forecast the future movement of the price, and will choose either the same behavior or the contrarious behavior as the other traders' behavior. The decision-making of traders will be also influenced by changes of the news related with the asset. When a good (bad) news increases (decreases) a trader may think that now is the time for him to buy (sell) the asset. Formally let us assume that the investment attitude of trader i is determined by minimization of the following evaluation function e i (x),
where J denotes the strength of the other traders' influence on a trader, and b denotes the strength of the reaction of a trader upon the change of the news s which may be interpreted as an external field, and x denotes the vector of investment attitude of all the traders x = (x 1 , x 2 , ......x N ). A trader who has the positive value of J is called as the trend follower and a trader who has the negative value of J is called as the contrarian. The optimization problem that should be solved for every trader to achieve minimization of their evaluation functions e i (x) is formalized by
E(x) is referred to as the internal energy in the statistical mechanics. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that b i = 0.
A minimum average energy principle for nonextensive entropy
In the previous subsection we assume implicitly that a trader can perceive the investment attitude of the other traders. However, in fact, a trader could not know the other traders' decision. This is the core of difficulty of forecasting the movement of financial markets. Under the circumstance that a large number of traders participates into trading, a probabilistic setting may be one of best means to analyze the collective behavior of the many interacting traders. Now let us introduce a random variable x k = (x k 1 , x k 2 , ......, x k N ), k = 1, 2, ....., W . The state of the traders' investment attitude x k occur with probability P k = Prob(x k ) with the requirement 0 < P k < 1 and W k=1 P k = 1. We formulate the amount of uncertainty before the occurrence of the state x k with probability P k using the so-called Tsallis entropy [11] .
where ln q x is the q-logarithm function: ln q x = (x 1−q − 1)/(1 − q), x > 0. S q is a generalization of the Bolztmann-Gibbs entropy. We ask how changes in the probability P k of the random variable affects the agents' choice. Then the objective of the agent is to minimize the expected evaluation function, E(x) (corresponding to average energy) for Tsallis entropy (3).
The first-order conditions for a minimum are derived by setting the partials of the Lagrangian
with respect to p i , α and β equal to zero:
The equilibrium probability distribution function as the solution of the above optimization problem is
where
and exp q x is the q-exponential function defined by
. The equilibrium probability distribution function P k is called the q-exponential distribution where P k is the probability that the traders' investment attitude is in the state k with the evaluation function E(x k ), and Z q is the partition function. We call the optimizing behavior of the traders with interaction among the other traders a relative expectation formation.
The price adjustment processes
Generally, in financial market the price changes are subject to the law of demand and supply, that the price rises when there is excess demand, and the price falls when there is excess supply. Therefore, when traders are supposed to either buy or sell a fixed amount of stock, say, one unit in a period, the price will rise if the number of the buyer exceeds the number of the seller ( N i=1 x i > 0) because there may be excess demand, and the price will fall if the number of seller exceeds the number of the seller ( N i=1 x i < 0) because there may be excess supply. It is natural to consider that the price fluctuations measured by relative price change is proportional to the demand-supply gap, and so volatility, measured by the absolute value of relative price changes, is proportional to the absolute value of the demand-supply gap. Let us suppose that absolute value of the demand-supply gap is proportional to the value of N i=1 N j=1 x i x j . Then volatility is described as
Volatility distribution
We assume that the traders are the contrarian, that is, J < 0. The volatility distribution is described by the q-exponential distribution,
where α is positive constant and V denotes the volatility. As is well known, for q > 1 the q-exponential distribution (12) for large volatility is approximated by a power-law distribution
Empirical studies on volatility in financial markets often find the power-law distributions of volatility. For instance Liu, et . al [17] analyze the SP 500 stock index and the stock prices of the individual companies comprising the SP 500 for the 13-year period Jan. 1984 to Dec. 1996, and find that the distribution of the volatility is consistent with a power-law asymptotic behavior, characterized by an exponent 4. Therefore, the parameter q of the volatility distribution (13) is estimated as q = 1.25 for the U.S. stock market.
Concluding remarks
This paper presents an interacting-agent model of speculative activity explaining the power-laws of the volatility distribution in terms of the nonextensive statistical mechanics. We show theoretically that the power-laws on price fluctuations is easy to understand as a result of the relative expectations formation of many interacting agents that is formalized as the minimum average energy principle for nonextensive entropy.
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